Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge.1
remotely capture the sophisticated interactions between soul and body postulated by Descartes himself. In an important sense, the soul-its location and its function as the active and moral essence of the individual-should be seen as the product of this forensic and physiological knowledge.3
Non-mental explanations for behaviours were transformed by the new anatomy of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the causes of a number of disorders were re-routed up towards the brain. Nevertheless, the fact that the mind could very easily have deleterious effects on the body remained a commonplace with as much anecdotal evidence as the corporeal aetiology of mental disease. The philosophical analysis of the workings of the soul was traditionally part of the domain of natural philosophy, and in this system it was generally held to be composed of two parts, the organic and the intellectual. Unlike the functioning of the intellect and the will, the operations of the organic soul required the physical organs and were concerned with vital operations in addition to those of imagination and memory. Since (following Aristotle) most authors believed that sensation was the basis of cognition, it was held that there were a number of internal senses which corresponded to the external sense organs and which were localizable in specific areas of the brain. In the sixteenth century, theorists of the soul moved away from adhering rigidly to faculty psychology and drew more and more from contemporary work in medicine, though this was of course still limited by theological doctrine.4
In the seventeenth century, anatomists and philosophers expressed a renewed interest in locating the precise place of the soul. Notoriously, Descartes located it in the pineal gland, but others, like Thomas Willis, disagreed. Willis, who remarked in his Cerebri anatome that he had "addicted [himself] to the opening of heads especially", followed Gassendi and divided the mind up into the rational soul and the animal or corporeal soul, allowing only humans to have an immortal soul that could not be affected by disease or other external problems. The corporeal soul, which humans shared with brutes, was composed of the socalled vital soul (in the blood), and the sensitive soul (located in the nervous system). This sensitive soul was closely linked to the rational soul, while the cerebral cortex served to elaborate the animal spirits in the nervous system which were extracted from the most subtle and active portions of the blood. The cortex was the seat of memory, while in general the animal spirits were essential for memory and imagination:
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The rational soul was placed in the corpus callosum, seat of the "imagination" or "phantasie", because "the Rational Soul depends very much, as to its operation, on the Phantasie, without the help of which, it can know or understand nothing".5
As Willis suggested, the role of the imagination (by the seventeenth century nearly always identified with the fancy or phantasie) was centrally important in the healthy working of the individual. Located by many writers along with common sense in the anterior central ventricle, it was held to be the most powerful source of a host of maladies such as madness and melancholy. It was closely related to the passions, and worked by reproducing images in the absence of those objects they represented. It could recombine stored images and, when under the guidance of reason, worked so as to produce new images. A number of traditions stressed the dangers of an ungoverned fancy. Ficino and Paracelsus linked the imagination to magical medicine and in De virtute imaginativa Paracelsus argued that "imagination can cause disease, can cause dreadful disease ... [it] is more than nature and rules it". Bacon claimed that the restoration of man involved "delivering and reducing" the mind from the deceptions of the imagination, while contemporaries like Burton complained that the deluding imagination would constantly "usurp no small authority to itself '.6 In the wake of the civil wars in England, the power of the imagination was invoked to account for what many took to be the lawless fury of the radicals. One of the most significant writers on this issue was Henry More, whose Enthusiasmus triumphatus of 1656 and Immortality of the soul of 1659 offered a mixture of evidence on the soul and the imagination drawn from anecdotal, philosophical, medical and theological sources. In the remainder of this paper, I look at More's work and then the use by Isaac Newton of this material and of other texts by authors such as Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Glanvill. I look at how Newton maintained a practical and experimental interest in the problem of self-movement throughout his career, a project which was sustained by means of a number of medical, alchemical and chemical researches. I conclude by looking at how he publicly presented the experience of free will and self-motion as an undeniable fact which pointed to the existence of non-mechanical laws of nature.7 5 Willis, Cerebri anatome: cui accessit nervorum M W Bundy, The theory of imagination in Classical descriptio et usus, London, 1664, p. Med., 1967, 41: 349-67 ; E Fischerunderstanding of the brain, see E Clarke and K Homberger, ' On the medical history of the doctrine Dewhurst, An illustrated history ofbrain function, of the imagination', Psychol. Med., 1979 , 9: 619-28, Oxford, Sandford Publications, 1972 and B C Southgate, "'The power of imagination":
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In this ventricle, the "thinner matter" which was termed the "animal spirits" was found in its "greatest purity and plenty", and even those who had followed Hippocrates in placing the common sensorium in the heart had done so because they believed that its left ventricle "was the fountain of these pure and subtile spirits . . .". The significance of these spiritous entities was confirmed by an "ocular demonstration" of Henricus Regius which More took to be "both ingenious and solid". This involved the observation of a shell-less snail which was moving in a glass: so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head; but so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.
The spirits were the "immediate instruments of sense and motion", as well being the chief organs of sight. This was clear from the fact that "dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these spirits . . ." and the common experience that when one's leg reawakens having "gone to sleep", one "may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pismires ... which can be nothing but the Spirits forcing their passage into the part". In the light of these considerations he concluded that the function of the brain and nerves was to "keep these subtile Spirits from over speedy dissipation". 1 There were significant objections to this conception which More fended off with customary braggadocio. Some had argued that the nerves contained a "milky white juice" and were unsuitable for the passage of the spirits, while others maintained that the brain's ventricles were too big for the purpose given them by More and were intended only for "receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain discharges itself of'. Furthermore, if these spirits were the means by which spontaneous motion were achieved, then "it could never be so sudden as it is, for we can wag our finger as quick as thoughts, but corporeal motion cannot be so swift". More replied that the nerves had to be porous, allowing for the easy passage of these spirits, for how otherwise did they derive their juice? The motion was instantaneous because it took place by pressure, just like sunlight does "through the aetherial Matter betwixt". Finally, whether or not the brain had the function assigned to them by his critics, The soul was diffused throughout the body at its earliest stages of growth and indeed supervised its development, while the movements of the heart and lungs were more than mechanical and were carried out by means of a "plastick power". This pervasiveness of the soul explained passions and "sympathies" and, whereas Descartes had used the phenomenon of a man's involuntary winking at the shake of another's hand near his face to argue for a purely corporeal reflex to all such situations, More argued that not all these responses were mechanical. The soul operated in many of these responses such as that of reacting to a terrifying monster: "it is the effect of her as she resides in the Heart and Stomack, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common Sensorium". This was put down to the "exquisite unity of the Soul with her self'. Likewise, vision required the existence of a soul extended all the way from the sensorium to the eye, for otherwise the colours of the things seen would be confounded and "the bigness of the Object diminished". More explained this by pointing to the path that the inverted image took from the retina to the optic nerve; without the presence of the soul to keep the initial image intact, it would become confused en route by the "depainture of sundry colours" already present on the retina.13
Having located the soul, it was possible to account for other bodily phenomena. It was obvious, for example, that the imagination's seat of action was in the animal spirits in the fourth ventricle. Following the analysis in his Enthusiasmus triumphatus of 1656, More argued that the imagination-used in "Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual entertainments"-was aided by "fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits .. ..". This was also the setting for the exercise of memory, which could not be reduced to the physical transformation of the brain in the shape of the things it represented. Again, animal spirits were essential for the proper functioning of this faculty, which he re-examined in a section on the preexistence of souls. Here he recounted a host of examples of individuals whose memory had been blighted by disease and violence, such as Messala Corvinus, who forgot his own name, another, who lost "all his learning" by means of "a blow with a stone", and "a young student of Montpelier, [who] by a wound, lost his memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again".14 Animal spirits also explained spontaneous motion which was performed "by the continuation of the Spirits from the seat of common sense to the Muscles, which is the gross Engine of motion". The precise manner in which this took 217-18, 219, 220, 223-4. "we partly feel and see; that is to say, we find in ourselves a power, at our own pleasure to move this or the other member with very great force, and that the Muscle swells that moves the part . . .". This clearly showed the "influx of Spirits, thither directed or there guided by our meer will". It was the "vinous" animal spirits that swelled the muscles, and More "look [ed] upon the Fibrous part of the Muscle as the main engine of motion". The soul "moistens" these fibrous parts with "that subtle liquor of the Animal Spirits", and this makes them "swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather". This was the main cause of the "notable strength of our Limbs in Spontaneous motion".15
Once this explanatory system was in place, there was no need to seek any further for hypotheses. The fact that such spirits had been seen in the fibrous matter of the muscles and the experience of our control over our own body was "sufficient to salve all Phaenomena of this kind". Spontaneous motion happens because the soul is extended throughout the body and that part of it which is in the muscles "guides the Spirits into such Pores and parts, as is most requisite for the shewing the use of this excellent Fabrick ... by a power near a-kin to that by which she made the Body and the Organs thereof'. By these means humans could walk and play music without thinking about the processes involved.16
Medico-theological projects which aimed to tease out the home of the soul and which claimed to be able to explain the complexities of mind-body interaction formed an integral part of the work of early modem divines and natural philosophers. Within this genre, More's books formed a particularly useful resource in the aftermath of the Restoration of 1660, since they pointed out how godly academics might steer a path between atheistic and enthusiastic models of the action of the soul. One intellectual who swiftly picked up More's approach as a basis for his own was Isaac Newton. More's system, and in particular his view of the soul was not directly embraced by him although hedid succeed in transforming More's approach into an experimental programme, and he took much of the empirical evidence in The immortality of the soul at face value. In the next section I look at how Newton created an experimental project aimed at elucidating the workings of the soul from his reading of a series of texts by More, Joseph Glanvill, Walter Charleton, and Thomas Hobbes. In so doing, Newton was also concerned with avoiding the deleterious theological and political consequences of ungodly accounts of the soul. After this, Newton found he could make the "phantasm" return, without looking at the sun. 17
The Brain of Isaac Newton
In time, strange things happened. When he looked on a bright object, he "saw upon it a round bright spot of light like ye sun". And so long as he "intended [his] phansy a little while" upon bright objects, this "phansy" began to make an impression on his left eye as well as his right, even though he had used only his right eye for the experiment. Each time, the effort required to do this was lessened, and soon Newton was unable to avoid seeing the sun wherever he looked, so much so that he had to shut himself up in his "chamber made dark for three days together & used all means to divert my imagination from ye Sun". By remaining in the dark and "imploying [his] mind about other things" he was able to use his eyes again, though for the next few months: "the spectrum of the sun began to return as often as I began to meditate upon ye phaenomenon, even tho I lay in bed at midnight with the curtains drawn". On top of this, he told Locke that he could probably make the image reappear "by the power of my phansy". Having finished telling this tale, he told Locke that the peculiar phenomenon related by Boyle, in which a man constantly saw the "phantasm" of the sun in bright objects, probably involved a concurrence of the man's "phansy" and the "impression made by ye sun's light":
17 Newton to Locke, 30 June 1691, in A R Hall, et same experiment was recounted to Conduitt in the al. (eds), The correspondence ofIsaac Newton, 7 mid 1720s; cf. King's College, Cambridge, Keynes vols, Cambridge University Press, 1959-81, vol. 3, Ms. 130 (15) . pp. 152-54, p. 153. Sixty years after the events, the and so your question about ye cause of this phantasm involves another about ye power of phansy wch I must confess is too hard a knot for me to untye. To place this effect in a constant motion is hard because ye Sun ought then to appeare perpetually. It seems rather to consist in a disposition of ye sensorium to move ye imagination strongly & to be easily moved both by ye imagination & by ye light as often as bright objects are looked upon.18
Newton's problem involved the function and location of the soul, the sensorium and the imagination, issues which captivated his interest right up to the end of his life and which went back to some of the earliest researches of his student days. His early notebook detailing these investigations constitutes an experimental programme based on carefully chosen notes from a number of sources. The basis of this programme was the search for the precise roles of the soul and the "outside" world in contributing to experience and knowledge, and under a heading initially entitled 'Occult Qualityes' but then changed to 'Philosophy', he noted that the nature of things was "more securely and naturally deduced from their operacouns one upon another yn upon or senses". When this was done by experiments and "we have found ye Nature of Bodys, by ye latter we may more clearly find the Nature of or senses". But as long as we "are ignorant of ye nature of both soule and body, we cannot clearly distinguish how far an act of sensation proceeds from ye soul and how far from the body". Indeed, the last aspect of this formulation appeared to be the goal of Newton's researches. What was the moral and mental topology of the brain? What powers did the soul possess?
To answer the topological issue, Newton read a number of different works, the most significant of which was More's The immortality ofthe soul. Information from More such as "to them of Java Pepper is cold" (under the heading 'Of Sensation') helped him formulate basic principles such as that "the senses of men are diversely affected by the same objects according to the diversity of their constitution". More was a fund of other material, such as ten possible sources for the location of the soul, and Newton drew liberally from the wealth of anecdotal and empirical information in his book: A frog's braine being peirced it looseth both sence and motion but it will leape and have its sence though its bowells bee taken out. Phisitians find ye causes of lethargies Apoplexies Epilepsies &c diseases yt seiz on ye Animall functions in ye head. Unles ye braine be peirced so deepe as to reach ye ventricles ye wound will not take away sence & motion. A man cannot see through ye hole wch a trepan makes in his head. Stones have beene found in ye glandula pinealis & it is invironed with a net of veines & arteries. A Vertigo must be from ye turning round of ye spirits. The least weight upon a mans braine when hee is trepanned maketh him wholly devoyd of sensation & motion.19
From these examples it is clear that he was fascinated both by the different responses of men to the same objects, and by the often negligible role of the soul in the performance of bodily activity. In a note entitled 'Of Motion', for example, he took down Joseph Glanvill's example of an artist who "plays a lesson not minding a stroke [and] sings neither minding nor missing a note", and argued-again using data from The immortality of the soul-that "the motion of ye stomack in vomitting (though wholly against our will 18 Hall, et al. and therefore merely mechanicall) by ye touch of a whalebone only", was a much better demonstration that "6ye actions of brutes to be mechanicall & independent of soules, than Chartes his instance of ye winking at ye shaking of a friends hand by ye eye". Continuing this line of enquiry, he noted the passage from More on the visible causes of a snail's motion, and compared this to a critique of a revolving wheel in Glanvill's Vanity of dogmatizing.20
In spite of this appreciation of the possible significance of mechanical motion in human action, there was a vast realm of behaviour which could not be reduced to mechanism. In a section entitled 'of ye soule', he followed More in rejecting Hobbes' materialism although he concurred with the author of De corpore that "probably ye soule perceives noe bodys but by ye helpe of their motion", Nevertheless (in an argument recollected in his letter to Locke), he claimed that thought could not be reduced to matter in motion, because then we would never be able to recall anything to memory. For "so long as yt action continews we must thinke of & remember yt phantasme", and not before that action ceases can we stop thinking of it in order to remember it. But if the act of remembering is itself merely matter in motion, "how shall we call this thing into memory ye action being done & we haveing no principle wth in us to begin such a motion againe wthin us [?] " In the light of these notes on Hobbes he then considered why it was that we perceived images to be outside our bodies when they were actually experienced in the sensorium. Although such operations took place somewhere in the brain, we did not see the brain "it not being in motion, & probably ye soule perceives noe bodys but by ye helpe of their motion". Images appear to be outside our bodies because "in ye image of things delineated in the braine by sight, ye bodys image is placed in ye midst of ye images of other things, is moved at or command towars & from those other images".21
Such considerations privileged the "principle" within us which began motion and which exercised control over the position of the body with respect to the outside world. In his quest for the seat of the soul-the place of this "principle"-Newton turned to In the notebook, this section on the imagination continues with the report of his optical self-experiment (although this was added some time later), but about the same time that he was taking these notes (in mid 1664), he was already considering the extent to which vision might be due to motion. Under the heading 'Of light', he suggested that "light cannot be by pression, for yn wee should see in ye night a wel or better yn in ye day we should se a bright light above us because we are pressed downwards" while "A man goeing or running would see in ye night". Similarly, in 'Of Vision', he remarked that relative permanency was required for perfect vision "thus a coale whirled round is not like a coale but fiery circle". A Morean note on the role of spirits in the functioning of vision was followed by some physiological considerations about the capillaments of the optic nerve, in order to explain why it was that we did not see two images. Again, his central concern was the distinction between the mechanical and the voluntary movements of the eye and the fancy. Some time later, he attempted to resolve these issues by means of a series of eye experiments.23
The reports of these trials suddenly appeared in a section on the imagination and fantasy. He remarked on how when he had finished looking at the sun, "I shfut my c- same motions are caused in my braines by both". He looked on some white paper and "by means of a strong phantasie" saw a spot which was darker than the paper, and he saw the same "phantasme" when looking at a bright cloud until at last he was able to make the spot glitter against the background of a "dusky red (whither I look upon ye paper or cloude) like ye Gin a cloud so bight my eys watered".24
Although-as he later confessed to Locke-this seriously damaged his eyes and resulted in his confinement to bed for a number of days, this was not before the same experiments had been rigorously retried: "Imploying my selfe in other exercises for two or 3 howers ["an hower before 0 sed [i.e. set] hee being wholly clouded" added] when I thought my eye was prety well restored I repeated all ye former experiment". A slight variation was that now when he looked at clouds with his good eye, "I could see ye 0 pictured on ye cloudes or other white objects almost as plaine as if I In the place where information from both sides of the brain arrived at a contact point, "by their extemall figure they seeme as if the capillamenta concentered like ye radij of a hemisphere to a point in ye lower part of the juncture". This was the probable location of the "visive faculty", for why otherwise "doe the nerves swell there to so great a bulke as it were preparing for their last office . . ."? This was where the cerebral texture was the finest, "in ye midst of the brain, constituting ye upper part of that small passage twixt all 25 Ibid., p. 444. Newton later took notes from Boyle on "tender" sight and hearing; see CUL Add. Ms. 3975 fol. 22. For the relationship between sensitivity and madness, see G Speak, "'An odd kind of melancholy": reflections on the glass delusion in Europe (1440-1680)', Hist. Psychiatry, 1990, 1: 191-206 , and for madness in general, see R Porter, Mind-forg'd manacles: a history of madness in Englandfrom the Restoration to the Regency, London, Athlone Press 1987. In his graduate notebook Newton set down some queries concerning whether the soul, being seemingly able to remember some dreams while one is awake, "be perpetually employed in sleepe", and he went on to ask accordingly if "dreames are of ye body or soule"; see 233r, and for the final version in the 1717/18 edition see Opticks, reprint, New York, Dover, 1979, pp. 346-7 and 353-4. ye ventricles". Light hit the retina and the vibration caused thereby produced a motion which was either carried to the sensorium or produced other motions. Water was too coarse a substance to carry this motion intact, while as for the putative role of animal spirits in this process, "though I lyed a peice of ye optick nerve at one end & warmed it in ye middle to see if any aery substance by that meanes would disclose it selfe in bubbles at the other end, I could not spy the least bubble; a little moisture only & ye marrow it selfe squeezed out".28
There was no need to suppose the existence of such fine particles, a hypothesis which in any case was liable to the problem that if such matter could enter the pores of the brain and nerves it "would be too subtil to bee imprisoned by ye dura mater & Skull". Such a conjecture was redundant since Motion is ever lost by communication especially twixt bodys of different constitutions: and therefore it can noe way bee conveyed to ye sensorium so entirely as by the aether it selfe. Nay granting mee but that there are pipes fill'd wth a pure transparent liquor passing from ye ey to ye sensorium & ye vibrating motion of ye aether will of necessity run along thither ... yt motion cannot stray through ye reflecting surfaces of ye pipe but must run along (like a sound in a trunk) intire to ye sensorium. This, Newton suggested, was "conformable to the sense of hearing wch is made by like vibrations", while the whiteness of the brain and nerves implied extraordinarily slender vessels. "Its pretty", he concluded, "to consider how these agree wth the utmost distinctnesse in vision".29 3. Trepanning the aether By the end of the 1660s, Newton had performed a number of dissections and related experiments to divine for himself how information might travel to and from the brain by means of the nerves and visual capillamenta. Implicit in this programme was a view of the role of the imagination in producing vision, as well as an account of the way in which the sensorium might control the motions of the muscles. His concern with this project continued into the 1670s and was further explored with the tools which he was developing in alchemy and which were related to biological issues. Betty Dobbs has recently argued that in a brief series of alchemical propositions from about 1669 (Keynes Ms. 12A), he was already showing his belief in a living vegetable chemistry, while this is clearly visible in two major writings of the early to mid 1670s. In the 1669 manuscript he spoke of a vitalistic alchemical agent and "fermental virtue" or "magnesia" which "accommodates itself to every nature. From metallic semen it generates gold, from human [semen] men etc.". In a work from the early 1670s called 'Of Nature's Obvious Laws and processes in vegetation' he argued that the earth resembled "a great animall ["or rather inanimate vegetable" added]", which "draws in aetheriall breath for its dayly refreshment and vital ferment and transpires again wth gross exhalations". The aether was "probably a vehicle to some more active spt. & ye bodys may bee concreted of both together", while "in ye aether ye spt is intangled". This spirit was the "material soule of all matter" and "perhaps spirits from the nerves met up with "saline-sulphureous" particles from the arterial blood, whereupon the "copula" formed by the union of the two would break and give rise to an "explosion" when stimulated by the nerves. In Pathologiae cerebri, this explanatory system changed so that the explosive nature of muscular action was caused by a meeting of "spirituo-saline" particles from the nerves and "nitro-sulphurous" particles from the blood. In his Tractatus duo of 1668, Willis's student Mayow argued against this that Willis's theory implied that the two different kinds of particles had at some previous stage been conjoined in the brain-in which case why would the chemical explosion not happen there? Rather, Mayow developed his account of aerial nitre to suggest that "nitro-saline" particles travelled in the arterial blood to the muscles where they remained. Animal spirits produced in the brain were dispersed to the muscles by means of the nerves, and after contact between them an explosion and hence muscular contraction occurred. These well-informed researches and speculations on the causes of muscle movement formed the context of a conversation that took place between Newton and Boyle in the spring of 1675, when the former visited London. In a letter of 14 December 1675 he asked Oldenburg to thank Boyle for the discourse in London during which they had discussed what Boyle had called Newton's "conceit of trapanning ye common Ether". The sense of his reference to Boyle "entertain[ing]" this proposal "with a smile" is obscure, but the topic of their talk clearly related to his project of accounting for the physiology of animal motion, and he expressed his hope that when Boyle had "a set of expts to try in his air pump, he will make that one to see how ye compression or relaxation of a muscle will shrink or swell, soften or harden, lengthen or shorten it". Although this would have been a more limited experiment involving the medium of air, Newton evidently hoped-to the apparent amusement of Boyle-that there might be some experimental means of manipulating the aether to see what effect this had on the muscle. The chemical notion of "sociability" offered him a way to do this.35
It was possible that the soul had "an imediate power over the whole aether in any part of the body to Swell or Shrink it at will", but this left unresolved the nature of the dependency of muscular motion on the nerves. Alternatively, it could be done by means of the soul acting upon the "aetheriall Spirit included within the Dura Mater", but "still 34 another". This "unsociablenes" might exist in aetherial substances while possibly "the reason, why Air stands rarer in the boxes of small Glass-pipes, & aether in the pores of bodies, then elsewhere may be, not want of subtlety, but Sociablenes". If this were so, then no matter how subtle the "aetheriall vital Spirit" was in man, it could be contained within the "coats" of the brain nerves and muscles if it was "unsociable" to them though "very Sociable to the marrow and Juices". Such a spirit could be sufficiently subtle "to pervade readily the Animall juices, [and] as any of it is Spent", be "continually supplyed by new Spirit from the heart".37
To make it suitable for animal motion, Newton brought to bear the phenomenon whereby "some things unsociable are made Sociable by the Mediation of a Third". Just as any two substances were naturally unsociable to one another but could be made "sociable" by the addition of yet another substance, so in like manner the aethereal Animal Spirit in a man may be a mediator between the common aether & the muscular juices to make them mix more freely; & so by sending a litle of this Spirit into any muscle, though so little as to cause no sensible tension of the muscle of its owne force, yet by rendering the juices more Sociable to the common external aether, it may cause that aether to pervade the muscle of its owne accord in a moment more freely & copiously then it would otherwise do & to recede againe as freely so soon as this Mediator of Sociablenes is retracted.
To produce major motions in bodies, he supposed only that the "Spring" of the aether in the muscle was extremely great so that even a little alteration in its density caused great alteration in the pressure. Such a mechanism might also be the cause of the motions of the heart, except that in this case the "Spirit" was "continually generated there by the fermentation of the Juices [and] let out by starts into the braine through some convenient ductus "38
For Newton, the production of the "Spirit" from this ferment was identical to the creation of electrical attraction from a glass caused by rubbing, or the "burning out of fewel to penetrate glasse, as Mr Boyle has showne, & calcine by corrosion Mettals melted therein". This highly original analysis of self-motion was also linked in the 'Hypothesis' to the processes underlying the phenomenon of light. That one should be wary of offering simplistic mechanical explanations of light was evidenced by the fact of self-motion: "God who gave Animals self motion beyond our understanding is without doubt able to implant other principles of motion in bodies wch we may understand as little". The fact of free will and the capacity for self-motion were always held by Newton as evidence that the normal laws of motion had application over a limited domain. Self-motion remained an undoubted phenomenon, whatever hypotheses were adduced for its explanation, and it was even possible that the same cause operated in the vegetable and animal spheres as worked to produce light. He concluded: "Some would readily grant this may be a Spiritual one; yet a mechanical one might be showne, did I not think it better to passe it by".39
In the draft 'Conclusio' to his 1687 Principia, he again returned to the researches of the late 1660s on the structure of the optic nerve, but this time he rejected the use of animal spirits in volitional motion. In the context of discussing "vibratory motion" which could be "propagated in solids by the forces of even non-contiguous particles", he discussed how the retina was agitated by light and "the remaining nerves by tangible objects ... propagated to the sensorium through the solid and continuous capillamenta of the nerves". In the other direction, by a similar motion propagated from the sensorium through the solid capillamenta of the nerves, a certain substance in the muscles can be agitated and by that agitation dilated so as to contract the muscles and move the limbs. For the animal spirits (which they feign) can hardly be propagated easily, swiftly and copiously enough through the compact substance of the nerves to swell the muscles.40 People sweat when undergoing exertion, not because the movement of the muscles gives rise to the inrush of these spirits, but because of "a certain agitation of the parts of the body by which the muscles are kept distended, and when this ceases they grow flaccid". In the Principia itself, there was a reference in the General Scholium of 1713 to a "most subtle spirit" which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies [by which] electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles.
In the edition of 1713, the reader was to be disappointed in the expectation of any further analysis and Newton concluded that "these are things that cannot be concluded in a few words, nor do we have at hand a sufficient number of experiments by which to demonstrate & determine the laws of action of this spirit accurately, as ought to be done". Nevertheless, in Motte's translation of 1729, the spirit (after consultation with Newton) is called "electric and elastick", while "electrici & elastici" is to be found in Newton's hand in the margins of his own copy of the second edition of the Principia. The connection between electricity and life did not emerge late on in the evolution of his natural philosophy (as a number of commentators have suggested), and goes right back to his experiments in the early 1670s and probably even earlier.41 4. In the Image of God: the Metaphysics of Self-motion The experimental project on the body, and the factuality of spontaneous motion were linked at the deepest level for Newton and they reappeared in a number of different contexts. For example, Dobbs has recently questioned the dating of the untitled manuscript which is now known by its first line "De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum", moving it from its previous home in the early 1670s to the period of the Principia in the mid-1680s. If this is true, Newton's care in picking apart the allegedly atheistic implications of the metaphysics of Descartes can be linked to the vehement attack on the latter's vortices which made up a part of the second book of the Principia, while he probably did not fully jettison his own belief in vortices until his work on De motu corporum in the mid 1680s. De gravitatione may probably have been intended for publication in the originally conceived Principia. In any case, as a number of pieces of evidence attest, it was a crucially important document which was used again and again by Newton in the rest of his career when he formulated relevant metaphysical positions.42
In De gravitatione, Newton attacked Descartes' identification of body with extension as atheistic, and put forward a notion of space in which there were always a multitude of figures not disclosed to sight. For Newton, these objects actually existed, although they became visible only when God endowed them with sensible qualities (in the same way that dye made visible swirling figures in water). After an analysis of the notion of space, he considered the nature of body. He gave a voluntarist underpinning for the existence of bodies, viz., that they existed by Divine Will, and proceeded to argue that the power of God was such that he could have created bodies in an infinite number of ways. Nevertheless, we were not aware of the exact nature of bodies and could only infer this nature from our perceptions of them. Following this, he stated that he would investigate "a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny to be within the power of God, so that we can hardly say that it is not body".43 41 F Cajori (ed.), Sir Isaac Newton's mathematical Reidel, 1982, pp. 191-213, and To get an idea of God's power, he considered the fact that all humans believed that they could move their own bodies "at will", while they also believed that all men "enjoy the same power of similarly moving their bodies by thought alone". This being so, God's power of moving bodies by will could be understood as being of a similar kind of action but infinitely greater and swifter; by "the sole act of thinking and willing" He could "prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits". Any such space made impervious to bodies would seem to be "truly body from the evidence of our senses (which constitute our sole judges in this matter)". If this "impenetrability" were transported according to certain laws, then it would "have shape, be tangible and mobile" and Newton did not see that it would "not equally operate upon our minds and in turn be operated upon, because it is nothing more than the product of the divine mind realized in a definite quantity of space". By definition, these sorts of bodies must be able to "excite various perceptions of the senses and the fancy in created minds, and conversely be moved by them. . .". The only problem with this schema, then, lay in the precise manner in which God imparted form to space. But this was reduced to the same problem of how we move our own bodies, "and nevertheless we do believe that we can move them". If we knew how we moved our own bodies, we might have some purchase on the larger problem. This was premissed on the analogy between God and man, and Newton argued that his analysis was designed to show that this analogy was much closer than previous Philosophers had realized-"that we were created in God's image holy writ testifies"-and in order that "God may appear (to our innermost consciousness) to have created the world solely by an act of will alone".44
If body were simply extension, as Descartes claimed, then this led to atheism and an unintelligible distinction between mind and body. Extension and thinking were not separate substances, for otherwise we would have to say that mind had no extension and so existed nowhere, and God would not "eminently contain extension within himself and thus [could] not create it". But in fact "if extension is eminently contained in God, or the highest thinking being ... both may fit the same created substance". The sense organs of humans were implicit in the definition of body, and Newton claimed that Descartes was wrong in his belief that extension remained after all non-essential items like gravity, hardness and sensible qualities had been removed from the notion of body:
For we may also reject that faculty or power by which [the sensible qualities] stimulate the perceptions of thinking beings. For since there is so great a distinction between the ideas of thinking and of extension that it is impossible that there should be any basis of connection or relation [between them] except that which is caused by divine power, the above faculty of bodies can be rejected without violating extension, but not without violating their corporeal nature.
It was not a question of an actual union of mind and body, since there were a number of bodies which were not united to minds, but concerned This was not the final time that he deployed his work on self-motion in a different sphere. Although he continued to think about the union between soul and body and the physical causes of spontaneous motion, the research was made public only in an attenuated form in the Queries of the Opticks and as an empirical fact which pointed both to the shortcomings of a purely mechanical philosophy and to laws other than those expressed in the Principia.4s
5. Active Principles and the Mechanical Threat The practical investigation of the related powers of the will and of the imagination remained of prime importance for Newton throughout the rest of his life. Notoriously, he vacillated between attributing events in nature to the direct volitional power of God, and to secondary instruments such as "active principles" responsible for various phenomena such as biological and mineral growth. The power of self-motion was a third possibility which was sometimes separated from active principles, and sometimes accounted by him as an example of them. In the three major editions of his Opticks (1704, 1706 (the Optice) and 1717/18), he progressively inserted material on the reality of an all-pervasive aether, and the third and final set of Queries were those that most vigorously asserted its existence. But in the earlier Query 28, Newton followed the conjunction outlined in an earlier manuscript from the 1690s in which he had asserted that God "decre [ed] amongst the drafts for one of the Queries to the Newton was a preformationist who held that the Opticks at CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fol. 235r. For embryo of the young is already present in the egg; extended material on the heart, see ibid., fol. 652r. "by the act of generation nothing more is done than See also P D Bowler, "'Preformation" and preto ferment the sperm of the female by ye sperm of ye existence in the seventeenth century: a brief male that it may thereby become fit nourishment for analysis', J. Hist. Bio., 1971, 4: 221-44. ye Embriyo. ffor ye nourishment of all animals is he turned to this as the best candidate for accounting for the principles and forces which were not covered by the Principia. In a draft Query 25 which was to have appeared in the 1717/18 Opticks, Newton saw the "very subtile, but active, potent, electric spirit" as just this mysterious and ubiquitous force: His manuscript corpus contains a number of detailed statements about the possible causes of self-motion and this apparently irreducible power came to be of central importance in his fight with Leibniz. The latter had accused any nonmechanical explanations of phenomena like gravity as being either occult (such as Newton's concept of gravitational attraction) or miraculous, and had asserted (on the basis of a rare print of the Optice which Newton had done his best to suppress) that the Newtonian philosophy held that space was literally the sensorium of God. After a supposedly impartial committee of the Royal Society had decided in favour of Newton's right to priority in the invention of the calculus, he had a group of letters relating to the affair published in a form known as the 'Commercium Epistolicum'. In a letter to the Abbe Conti of 26 February 1716 he complained that Leibniz had not responded to this publication, and he replied to the metaphysical issues that were then being debated elsewhere in the correspondence which was nominally between Leibniz Clarke's response to Leibniz's first letter began with a statement of the Newtonian party line on the status of space and its relation to God, linking this "by similitude" to the way in which "the mind of man" sees images "as if they were the things themselves". Later, he argued that by "sensorium" Newton meant the place of sensation rather than the organs of sense themselves, while the soul in man was not present to all parts of the body but operated only "upon the brain, or certain nerves and spirits, which, by laws and communications of God's appointing, influence the whole body". In the more substantial two final letters to Leibniz, Clarke trotted out his master's opinion on the miraculous or deterministic nature of the mind-body system in Leibniz's scheme and lashed his opponent's system as "wholly taking away the very idea of liberty". Like God, humans remained active beings with their own principle of action, even when faced by two apparently indistinguishable choices.52
In the final letter, Clarke made clear the restrictive political and religious consequences of Leibniz's position and stressed the connection between the notion of free will and the responsible individual: "the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty is, whether the immediate physical cause or principle of action be indeed in him whom we call the agent". On the other hand, Leibniz's philosophy "tends to make men be thought of as mere machines, as Descartes imagined beasts to be", and crucially, "by taking away all arguments drawn from phenomena, that is, from the actions of men, to prove there is any soul, or any thing more than mere matter in at all". If preestablished harmony were true, then "a man does not indeed see, nor hear, nor feel any thing, nor move his body, but only dreams that he sees, and hears, and feels, and moves his body".53 , 1962, 15: 63-126, pp. 73, 74, 114 and 109. of the new King's resident Court philosopher were no better than that of the freethinkers and deists. In this context, the correspondence with Leibniz on the nature of liberty, divinity and kingship was of the utmost significance. In the face of renewed threats from the Pretender, a number of Whigs had moved closer to the court in their bid to stabilize the Hanoverian succession, and Steven Shapin has pointed out that the immediate political setting for Clarke's work was the rejection of traditional Whig views of a monarchy limited by law in favour of a more absolutist ruler who reigned by fiat. In addition to this, the recent experiences of William Whiston and Clarke, who had both been hounded for their antitrinitarian beliefs, meant that there was a great need for natural philosophers who were Court Whigs to prove that Newtonian theology was orthodox.54
The related issue of whether thought could be an essential property of matter-or had necessarily to be superadded to it by God-had come to the fore with the publication of John Locke's Essay concerning human understanding in the early 1690s, and was directly addressed (in a series of arguments which owed much to Newton) by Richard Bentley in his second Boyle Lecture (Matter and motion cannot think) of 1692. In his own Boyle Lectures of 1704-5, Clarke stressed the unbounded nature of God's will and attacked the notion that matter might have a principle of self-motion within itself. Only if activity was superadded to brute matter could God's power and the immortality of the soul be guaranteed; without freedom of the will, there was no such thing as moral responsibility and a society premised on such a deterministic view of man was doomed to collapse into anarchy. Although the requirements of different contexts coloured the precise way in which Clarke defended human, monarchical and Divine will, the extent of legitimate use of will which he accorded to these beings was highly unusual for a Whig thinker in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Despite the relative stability of his position between 1704 and 1716, it is correct to point out that Clarke's specific accounts of the domain of will were fashioned for local contexts. Yet although it may not be true that Newton wrote Clarke's side of the correspondence, this paper has pointed to what was perhaps a highly significant source of Clarke's writings.55sensation-our only means of gaining knowledge about the outside world-derives from the soul or body unless one had a well-grounded understanding of their functions and operations. It was an experimental project which drew from a number of different tools in his intellectual armoury, which spanned the whole of his career, and which was expressed publicly as a conviction that self-movement proved both the reality of individual freewill and that there was more to comprehending the world than was demonstrated in the Principia. At stake was something which might have completed Newton's overall concern with uncovering the laws of nature through natural philosophy, and which by analogy would have pointed to an understanding of how God created and then existed with His world. Nevertheless, the fact that this medically-derived project was based on a series of private experimental researches which sought to explicate the mind-body relationship remained largely unknown to his contemporaries. Ironically, his rich physiological material could not fully be deployed by the physicians and philosophers who went on in the period following the publication of the Principia to use Newton's doctrines and authority to construct a "Newtonian" physiology.56
